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 FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS: A BRIEF 
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 
MICHAEL HEISE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Although few dispute the appellate process‘s centrality to justice systems,1 
especially in the criminal context,
2
 debates over rationales supporting the 
appellate process‘s vaunted status in adjudication systems persist.  Clearly, it 
is difficult to overestimate error correction as a justification for an appellate 
system.  Of course, other rationales, such as a desire for lawmaking
3
 and 
legitimacy,
4
 also support the inclusion of a mechanism for appellate review in 
an adjudication system. 
Though comparative latecomers, appellate courts are now ubiquitous in 
the American legal landscape—appellate review exists in state5 and federal6 
systems for criminal convictions.  Despite general agreement and widespread 
understanding that access to appellate review is a critical component of a 
comprehensive judicial system, the outcomes of appellate courts and, equally 
important, how to interpret the outcomes, are comparatively less well 
understood and developed in the research literature.  In particular, the 
distribution of appeals outcomes as well as explanations for the distribution 
warrant additional scholarly attention. 
To address this scholarly gap, this Article assesses federal criminal 
appeals from an empirical perspective.  Modest in ambition and scope, this 
Article seeks only to map the broad empirical contours of federal criminal 
appellate activity in the United States.  The initial research question focuses 
 
* Professor, Cornell Law School.  Mark Chutkow, Matthew C. Heise, and Mian R. Wang, 
along with participants in the Marquette University Law School Criminal Appeals: Past, Present, and 
Future Conference, provided helpful comments on a prior version of this Article.  Cornell Law 
School reference librarians provided invaluable research assistance.  
1. See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 379, 379 (1995). 
2. See generally Harold W. Elder, Trials and Settlements in the Criminal Courts: An Empirical 
Analysis of Dispositions and Sentencing, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1989) (analyzing settlements only 
within the criminal context). 
3. Shavell, supra note 1, at 381. 
4. See Martin Shapiro, Appeal, 14 L. & SOC‘Y REV. 629, 636 (1980). 
5. See Betsy Dee Sanders Parker, Comment, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
(“AEDPA”): Understanding the Failures of State Opt-In Mechanisms, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1969, 1975–
76 (2007) (noting how states provide for criminal appeals).  
6. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (general appeal of right), § 2106 (appeal of sentence). 
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on the basic results of appellate reviews of federal criminal cases.  Existing 
data germane to this question, while far short of thorough and definitive, 
provide some helpful guidelines and trends.  The second research question—
what one can responsibly infer from the results—is far more complicated and 
illusive and, therefore, limited.  Important limitations to existing data, as well 
as the influence of selection effects, contribute to the second research 
question‘s complexity and illusiveness.  While existing data sketch out the 
general contours of what our federal appellate courts are doing in the criminal 
setting, how to interpret these data remains unclear. 
II.  DATA 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission annually gathers and reports criminal 
appeals data.  Available cross-sectional data used in this study include 
information on 10,052 appeals resolved in fiscal year 2006.
7
  Of these 10,052 
appeals, disposition information was gathered for those defendants appealing 
their sentence or sentence and conviction.  The 1,625 appeals seeking only to 
overturn a conviction on appeal were excluded from the Sentencing 
Commission‘s data.  Of the 8,427 remaining appeals, 144 were excluded due 
to missing information on the type of appeal.  Of the 8,283 usable appeals, 
138 involved an appeal by the government and were excluded from many (but 
not all) of the analyses.  These exclusions generated a final usable sample of 
8,145 federal criminal appeals.
8
 
As helpful as the data might be, important limitations reduce their 
generalizability.  Questions about how to interpret results endure.  For 
example, at a basic level it is not entirely clear what data on federal criminal 
trial appeal outcomes mean or stand for.  As Professor Shavell notes, the 
selection effects and case stream filtering that take place before the criminal 
appeals process even begins supply critical context necessary to inform 
criminal appellate outcomes.
9
  Criminal appellate outcomes are a function of 
those criminal cases that pursue an appeal to its outcome.  Factors that 
influence the stream of criminal cases that pursue an appeal to its outcome 
include prosecutors exercising discretion over which criminal cases to pursue, 
pretrial plea bargaining, and posttrial (and pre-appeal) settlement activity. 
Although such nuanced influences as the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion are notoriously difficult to assess with empirical rigor, theory (and 
conventional wisdom) provides helpful direction.  Selection effects and case 
stream filtering work in a manner that most often reduces the number of 
 
7. Fiscal Year 2006 runs from October 1, 2005 through September 30, 2006, inclusive. 
8. U.S. SENT‘G COMM‘N, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 141–43 
tbl.56 n.1 (2006) [hereinafter U.S.S.C., 2006 SOURCEBOOK], available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006table56.pdf. 
9. See Shavell, supra note 1, at 414–15. 
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criminal appeals likely to be reversed.
10
  Moreover, the criminal justice 
system‘s structural tilt favoring the accused—the ―beyond a reasonable 
doubt‖ standard of proof imposed for conviction and the general prohibition 
on governmental appeal of acquittals—individually and collectively skew the 
sub-pool of criminal convictions that stimulate an appeal.  As a result, the 
residual pool of criminal appeals likely systematically differs from the larger 
universe of criminal trial outcomes.  If so, the influence of these factors 
complicates efforts to interpret criminal appellate results, including raw 
criminal appellate reversal rates. 
III.  DISCUSSION 
Important limitations notwithstanding, the data provide for a rough outline 
of the federal criminal appeals terrain.  The descriptive findings focus on the 
type of appeal, disposition, variation across circuits, as well as the influence 
of a relatively recent key U.S. Supreme Court decision, United States v. 
Booker.
11
  Moreover, prior work on civil appellate outcomes provides a useful 
(albeit imperfect) reference point against which one can assess criminal 
appellate outcomes.  Before turning to the results of the analyses, however, 
this Article briefly considers why appeals in general, and criminal appeals in 
particular, warrant more scholarly attention. 
A.  Why Worry About Appeals? 
Despite their comparative scarcity, appealed cases—far more than cases 
that settle or go to trial—form the basis of much of what many observers 
know about the legal system.  For much of the public, aside from those with 
first-hand experience with and knowledge of the legal system, perceptions 
about the law flow from some level of familiarity with appellate decisions, 
especially Supreme Court decisions.  Far too few citizens fully grasp that 
institutions other than appellate courts handle the overwhelming majority of 
the legal ―work.‖ 
What is generally true for much of the public is also true—though to a 
lesser extent—for informed observers and for many legal scholars.  Appellate 
decisions dominate law school casebooks and contribute to legal doctrine and 
to precedent that binds trial courts.  Much of the work of scholars who focus 
on how our legal system actually works relies on published court decisions.  
In addition, appellate court decisions are far more accessible in the major 
searchable legal databases (such as Westlaw and Lexis).  This further tilts 
legal research toward appellate courts and appellate decisions and away from 
the far larger mass of unappealled trial court decisions. 
 
10. Id. 
11. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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What is true at the general level—appealed cases‘ disproportionate 
influence—is perhaps even truer in the federal criminal context.  Structural 
differences and the generally higher stakes render criminal law, especially 
federal criminal law, more influential in the eyes of many.  Criminal law 
violations are, by definition, construed as violations against the state.  
Although civil matters can (and periodically do) involve the spectacular, as 
between civil and criminal the latter tends to dominate the public psyche.  The 
media and popular culture‘s periodic preoccupation with law typically 
preferences criminal over civil matters.  Indeed, the media routinely describes 
and displays crimes.  Criminal—far more than civil—law litters the popular 
culture landscape, ―from television, to movies, to books.‖12 
In addition, the scope and stakes of American criminal law continue to 
stagger.  As the economy and population have grown over two centuries, the 
United States has achieved the largest prison population in human history, 
with the highest imprisonment rate in the industrialized world.
13
  ―In the 
process, the empire of criminal justice in the United States has become as 
broad in its reach as it has been exceedingly harsh in its effects.‖14  In many 
instances, including capital crimes, the stakes involved in criminal law could 
not be any higher.  Finally, although criminal law remains principally the 
province of the states, federal criminal law has increased both in relative and 
absolute terms over time.
15
 
Within the appellate context, the sheer increase of federal criminal appeals 
over time contributes to criminal law‘s influence in the appeals process.  As 
Professor Galanter notes, the federal criminal caseload (measured in terms of 
raw number of defendants) increased between 1962 and 2002, if modestly 
(compared to the civil caseload) and unevenly.
16
  In 1955, fewer than 5,000 
appeals were filed in federal courts of appeals.  Fifty years later, in 2004, the 
number of filings exceeded 61,000.
17
  Thus, at the same time the raw number 
 
12. Steven Friedland, Teaching Property Law: Some Lessons Learned , 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
581, 590 (2002); see id. at 590 n.38 (remarking that criminal law penetrates popular culture far 
deeper than property law). 
13. See, e.g., James Vicini, Number of U.S. Prisoners Has Biggest Rise in 6 Years, Reuters 
(June 27, 2007), www.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleId=USN2637053120070627 (noting that the 
prison population in the United States is approximately 2.2 million, in China it is 1.5 million, and in 
Russia it is 900,000). 
14. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Political Economies of Criminal Justice, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 941, 942 (2008). 
15. See, e.g., Michael E. Horowitz & April Oliver, Foreword: The State of Federal 
Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1033, 1039–40 (2006) (―[F]ederal courts have been overrun with 
criminal cases.‖). 
16. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in 
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 492, 493 fig.23 (2004). 
17. See Richard A. Posner, Demand and Supply Trends in Federal and State Courts Over the 
Last Half Century, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 133, 137 tbl.3 (2006). 
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of federal appeals increased, the proportion of criminal cases that blossomed 
into appeals also grew.  This interaction helps place federal criminal appeals 
on the center stage of legal research. 
B.  Types of Federal Criminal Appeals and Their Disposition 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission gathers data on federal appeals of 
criminal sentences, as well as appeals of sentences and convictions.  Table 1 
illustrates that as between these two broad types of criminal appeals, more 
than twice as many appeals involve only a criminal sentence rather than a 
sentence and conviction (71.4% vs. 28.6%). 
Table 1 also makes clear that most criminal appeals, regardless of type, 
are affirmed.  This finding comports with what conventional wisdom would 
predict.  Because pursuing a criminal appeal is essentially free—or, more 
accurately, because criminal appellants are not forced to internalize the full 
costs of their appeal—there is little incentive not to appeal.  Consequently, 
many commentators characterize a large percentage of criminal appeals as 
meritless, if not frivolous.
18
  As a consequence, a high affirmance rate is 
expected. 
Table 1: 2006 Federal Criminal Appeals Disposition by Type (%)
19
 
 All 
Appeals 
Sentence 
Only 
Sentence & 
Conviction 
Affirmed 68.5 71.6 60.8 
Reversed 11.7 10.2 15.2 
Affirmed and 
Reversed in Part 
2.8 2.2 4.0 
Remanded 9.3 8.2 12.1 
Dismissed 7.8 7.8 7.7 
Total Appeals 8,145 5,817 2,328 
A distinct, though related, question involves assessing whether the federal 
criminal appeals affirmance rate is low or high.  Such an assessment, 
however, requires context that is, unfortunately, not readily available.  
Drawing on various disparate sources suggests that the affirmance rate found 
for federal criminal appeals in 2006 (68.5%) is roughly comparable to 
 
18. See generally PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1976); John T. Wold, 
Going Through the Motions: The Monotony of Appellate Court Decisionmaking, 62 JUDICATURE 58, 
61 (1978) (describing the ―right of indigents to a ‗free‘ appeal‖ as ―result[ing] in a caseload . . . of 
‗routine,‘ nonmeritorious appeals‖). 
19. U.S.S.C., 2006 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 141–43 tbl.56.  See also United States 
Sentencing Commission, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Convictions and Sentences: Appeals Data, 
2006 (ICPSR 20101) [hereinafter U.S.S.C. 2006], http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD/ 
STUDY/20101.xml, which was the source of data used in this table and in Tables 4–6, infra. 
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affirmance rates from state criminal appeals as well as prior federal appeals.  
In a study of five state criminal appeals courts in the late 1980s, Chapper and 
Hanson found affirmance rates that ranged from 70.8% (Rhode Island) to 
81.7% (Maryland).
20
  In addition, Table 2 illustrates that the affirmance rate in 
2006 is comparable to past years (with the notable exception of 2005). 
 
Table 2: Percentage of Federal Criminal Appeals Affirmed, by Year
21
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Civil appeals rates supply another point of reference.  Comparisons with 
results from civil appeals, presented in Table 3, raise important 
methodological problems, however.  Structural differences between the civil 
and the criminal contexts impede ready comparisons of appeals results.  
Differences in standing to appeal are among the important structural 
differences.  In the civil context, either party has the ability to appeal.  In the 
criminal context, however, constitutional double jeopardy protections for 
criminal defendants generally afford defendants only with the opportunity to 
appeal an adverse trial judgment.
22
  As a result, even if one were inclined to 
compare criminal and civil appeal outcome rates, it is not entirely clear 
whether the appropriate rate is that which involves only defendants who 
appeal adverse trial court decisions or, instead, the overall civil appeal 
 
20. See JOY A. CHAPPER & ROGER A. HANSON, NAT‘L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
UNDERSTANDING REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CRIMINAL APPEALS 35 tbl.3 (1989). 
21. See U.S. Sentencing Commission‘s SOURCEBOOKS from 1995 through 2007, available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm. 
22. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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outcome rate.  Owing to an asymmetric distribution of appeal outcomes for 
plaintiffs and defendants in the civil context,
23
 the decision about the proper 
reference group is important.  In addition, differences in applicable standards 
of proof that separate civil and criminal trials may also influence comparisons 
of appeal rates. 
Despite important difficulties in comparing criminal and civil reversal 
rates, general impressions arise without too much difficulty.  The overall 
criminal reversal rate (11.7%) is lower than the overall civil reversal rates, 
state or federal (32.1% and 18.4%, respectively).
24
  Moreover, if civil appeals 
by defendants are more comparable to federal criminal appeals, the 
discrepancy is even starker.  Defendants in civil litigation are far more likely 
to prevail on appeal than defendants seeking to reverse a sentence or 
conviction (or both).
25
 
1.  What to Make of the Comparatively Low Criminal Appeal Reversal Rate? 
Many instinctively seek comfort from the comparably low criminal 
reversal rates.  After all, comparatively low criminal reversal rates plausibly 
imply that criminal trial courts are ―getting it right‖ in an overwhelming 
percentage of cases.  Given the stakes for criminal defendants, this public 
impulse is understandable. 
On the other hand, however, the comparably low reversal rate might be an 
artifact of a highly skewed subset of convicted criminal defendants who 
pursue an appeal.  That is, given the assuredly skewed stream of convicted 
criminal defendants who that pursue an appeal, perhaps the observed level of 
reversal rates is low.  Simply put, and similar to civil context, the 
overwhelming bulk of ―activity‖ in our criminal justice system takes place 
outside of trials.  Plea bargaining resolves the ―vast majority‖ of federal 
criminal cases, and plea bargains are rarely reviewed for error.
26
  Moreover, a 
growing array of criminal procedural doctrines has expanded, with the 
cumulative effect of precluding appellate relief even when the appellate court 
finds trial court error.
27
  Without a firm understanding of how the criminal 
 
23. See Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An Empirical 
Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 124 (2009) (discussing asymmetrical 
distribution in state civil appeals); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the 
Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 
947 (2002) (examining statistics on federal civil appeals). 
24. See Table 3 infra. 
25. See Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 23, at 144–48 (assessing why civil appeals courts tend 
to favor defendants). 
26. Rosanna Cavallaro, Better Off Dead: Abatement, Innocence, and the Evolving Right of 
Appeal, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 943, 978 (2002). 
27. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2055 
n.91 (2000) (noting the impact of forgiving trial court errors through the harmless error doctrine).  
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cases that proceed to trial might systematically differ from the vast bulk of 
cases resolved through a plea bargain, criminal reversal rate findings tell us 
precious little. 
Further, instances in which the trial court clearly ―got it wrong‖ and 
wrongfully convicted factually innocent individuals profoundly challenge 
public confidence in the assumption that criminal trials courts are ―getting it 
right‖—certainly not always.  No context is more visceral in this regard than 
the exoneration of death row inmates on the basis of DNA evidence.  Recent 
successes by the Innocence Project remind us all of the appellate court‘s most 
salient mission—error reversal.  The public‘s tolerance for error, however, 
continues to grow thin, so much so that wrongful convictions of death row 
inmates—admittedly a stunningly rare event—nonetheless contribute to an 
erosion of public support for the death penalty.
28
 
 
Table 3: State and Federal Civil Trials, Reversal Rates (%)
29
 
 State Federal 
All Trials 32.1 18.4 
Jury Trials 33.7 20.4 
Judge Trials 27.5 16.5 
Appealing 
Party 
 
 
Defendant 41.5 32.5 
Plaintiff 21.5 12.0 
Total 
Reversals 
176 1,355 
 
C.  Geographic Variation 
National snapshots of our legal system—in particular, our federal 
appellate criminal justice system—often mask important variation across 
circuits.  Indeed, geography often influences an array of outcomes in the legal 
system, including appeal outcome,
30
 damages,
31
 and disposition time.
32
  
 
28. See Daniel J. Sharfstein, European Courts, American Rights: Extradition and Prison 
Conditions, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 719, 741 (2002) (―[P]ublic support for the death penalty has recently 
declined somewhat after revelations about the actual innocence of dozens of people wrongly sent to 
death row. . . .‖). 
29. Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 23, at 130 tbl.1. 
30. See, e.g., id., supra note 23, at 140. 
31. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 
623, 630–32 (1997) (discussing the salience of geography to punitive damages). 
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Results in Table 4 comport with these other results that found geographic 
variation.  Although the overall average nationwide affirmance rate for 2006 
criminal appeals was 68.5%, across the nation‘s twelve federal circuits 
affirmance rates ranged from a low of 49.3% (D.C. Circuit) to a high of 
85.1% (Eleventh Circuit).  Reversal rates ranged from 5.7% to 20.5%.  
Remand and dismissal rates displayed even greater variation; remand rates 
ranged from 2.3% to 22.1%, and dismissal rates varied from 0.5% to 27.8%. 
Of course, to some degree the influence of geography may mask the effect 
of varied case types.  That is, available data do not permit more finely 
granulated analyses for criminal case types and the selection effects 
challenges they might impose.  This is important insofar as the prosecution of 
some crimes (particularly complex crimes) might lend themselves more to 
reversible error than other types of crimes.  The influence of crime types may 
distort the influence of geography if we assume that appeals of various crime 
types do not distribute randomly across the federal circuits.  Such an 
assumption—that crime types do not distribute randomly across circuits—is 
borne out in other research.
33
  Thus, while the results in Table 4 provide a 
helpful starting point, once again more probative results require data that are 
not readily available. 
 
32. See Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition 
Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 836–38 (2000) (discussing the influence of geography on state 
civil case disposition time). 
33. See Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of 
Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477, 
553–54 (2002) (finding criminal case type variation across federal districts). 
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Table 4: 2006 Criminal Sentencing Appeals Disposition by Circuit (%)
34
 
 Affirmed Reversed 
Affirmed & 
Reversed 
Remanded Dismissed 
National 
Average 
68.5 11.7 2.8 9.3 7.8 
Circuit      
First 73.5 13.2 7.3 4.7 1.3 
Second 64.6 12.4 5.8 16.8 0.7 
Third 63.0 20.1 1.7 10.7 5.7 
Fourth 71.8 13.2 2.0 4.6 8.5 
Fifth 74.2 12.5 1.5 7.7 4.1 
Sixth 62.6 20.5 3.5 8.7 4.6 
Seventh 59.1 12.7 1.8 6.5 19.9 
Eighth 83.7 5.7 2.1 5.0 3.6 
Ninth 53.6 9.7 4.0 22.1 10.6 
Tenth 58.2 6.6 1.8 5.6 27.8 
Eleventh 85.1 8.2 3.9 2.3 0.5 
D.C. 49.3 11.6 1.4 31.9 5.8 
Total 
Dispositions 
5,579 955 224 756 631 
D.  Booker’s Influence 
The Supreme Court‘s United States v. Booker35 decision dealt the world of 
federal criminal sentencing a profound shock.  The United States Sentencing 
Commission,
36
 created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
37
 established a 
sentencing ―grid‖ (Guidelines) whereby the sentencing range for a defendant 
was determined as a function of, among other variables, the seriousness of the 
crime and the defendant‘s criminal history (if any).38  The Guidelines went 
into effect on November 1, 1987, and applied immediately to most federal 
crimes committed after that date and until the Booker decision in 2005.  As it 
relates to American federal criminal law, contemporaneous observers 
described the Guidelines as the ―most dramatic change in our Nation‘s 
 
34. U.S.S.C., 2006 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 8, at 141–43 tbl.56.  The disposition percentages 
and totals listed are based on a total number of 8,145 appeals. 
35. 543 U.S. 220 (2005); see also United States v. Morris, 429 F.3d 65, 69 (4th Cir. 2005). 
36. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2006). 
37. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted as Title II of the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987–2034 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C and 28 U.S.C.). 
38. For a fuller description, see Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, 
Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1377, 1397 n.72 (1998). 
2009] EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL APPEALS 835 
history.‖39 
What makes Booker critical is that it unwound the Guidelines‘ ―most 
dramatic change‖ to criminal sentencing.  Specifically, Booker rendered the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission‘s Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory 
and their application subject to review for reasonableness.  In determining an 
appropriate sentence, a district judge must initially calculate the sentence 
range recommended by the Guidelines.  A court must then assess whether a 
sentence within the range proposed by the Guidelines is consistent with the 
factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
40
  Criminal sentences that fall within 
the range recommended by the Guidelines benefit from a presumption of 
reasonableness.  Now that the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, however, a 
sentencing judge may rely on facts other than those found by the jury or 
specifically admitted by the defendant when calculating a sentence.
41
  
Subsequent decisions confirm the judiciary‘s recapture of sentencing 
discretion.
42
 
Not surprisingly, the Booker decision signaled a ―transitional moment,‖43 
one that predictably and profoundly influenced criminals and federal criminal 
sentencing.  One expected outcome includes an increased reversal rate for 
criminal appeals from defendants sentenced under the pre-Booker regime.  
Another expected outcome is that appeals that cite to Booker would be more 
likely to generate a reversal.  The data provide support for both expected 
outcomes. 
Table 2 makes clear that the federal appellate courts took Booker‘s 
admonition seriously, as the decision correlates with an abrupt and palpable 
reduction in the criminal appeals affirmance rate.  From 1995 through 2004, 
the affirmance rate hovered at approximately 80%.  In 2005, the year Booker 
was decided, the affirmance rate suddenly dropped to just over 54.9%.  One 
year later, while courts continued to work through a backlog of Booker-
inspired appeals, the affirmance rate increased to 68.5%.  By 2007, the final 
year of available data, the affirmance rate climbed back to 80%, or the pre-
Booker level.  Whether the criminal appeals affirmance rate has now fully 
digested the shock imposed by Booker and reestablished its equilibrium is not 
yet clear. 
The results in Table 2, while helpful, provide only a timeline.  Although 
the palpable drop in affirmances in 2005 obviously correlates with the Booker 
 
39. See 133 CONG. REC. 26,367 (1987) (remarks of Rep. Conyers). 
40. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. 
41. See United States v. Moncivais, 492 F.3d 652, 665 (6th Cir. 2007). 
42. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
43. See Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 
922, 939 (2006). 
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decision, the nature of the relation is not fully understood.  A similar, though 
distinct, question involves the degree to which appeals that cite to Booker 
correlate with an appellate court reversal.  To illustrate Booker‘s influence on 
2006 appeals, Table 5 presents results from a re-analysis of Table 1 and 
breaks out appeals that cited to Booker from those that did not.  At the 
descriptive level, results in Table 5 clearly suggest that citation to Booker 
influenced an appeal‘s outcome.  Notably, the overall reversal rate for appeals 
that cited to Booker is twice that of appeals that did not (14.6% versus 6.7%).  
Also, appeals that cited to Booker experienced almost half as many dismissals 
(5.8% versus 11%) and more than five times as many remands (13.2% versus 
2.6%). 
Obviously, it was not appellate courts‘ mere citation to Booker that 
accounted for the different outcomes.  More likely is that an appeal that cited 
to Booker involved issues germane to Booker, and, therefore, the Supreme 
Court‘s 2005 decision made these issues less legally stable.  Regardless of 
what an appeal‘s citation to Booker might signal, Table 5 makes clear that 
these two substreams of appeals differ in terms of appeals dispositions. 
Table 5: Influence of Booker Citation for 2006 Criminal Appeals 
Disposition by Type (%)
44
 
 All 
Appeals 
Sentence 
Only 
Sentence & 
Conviction 
Booker cited in appeal  
 
 
 
 
   Affirmed 63.1 67.7 51.8 
  Reversed 14.6 12.5 20.0 
  Affirmed & Reversed in Part 3.3 2.6 4.9 
  Remanded 13.2 11.4 17.5 
  Dismissed 5.8 5.9 5.7 
Total Appeals 5,150 3,672 1,478 
Booker not cited in appeal    
  Affirmed 77.7 78.3 76.4 
  Reversed 6.7 6.5 7.3 
  Affirmed & Reversed in Part 1.9 1.7 2.5 
  Remanded 2.6 2.7 2.6 
  Dismissed 11.0 10.9 11.3 
Total Appeals 2,995 2,145 850 
Further and closer analysis of a comparison of a key outcome—
 
44. U.S.S.C. 2006, supra note 19. 
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reversals
45—that involved citations to Booker, and those reversals that did not, 
uncovers important differences between the two groups.  Because Booker 
dealt with the Guidelines, the analysis in Table 6 only includes appeals 
involving a defendant‘s sentence.  As Table 6 illustrates, appellate reversals 
systematically distribute unevenly between sentencing-related appeals that 
cited to Booker and those that did not. 
Table 6: Booker Citations’ Influence on 2006 Criminal Appeals Outcomes 
(Sentence Only)
46
 
 
 
Trial Court 
Decision 
Affirmed 
Trial Court 
Decision 
Reversed 
Booker Cited? 
 
 
 
 
  Yes 3,214 458 
  No 2,006 139 
Total Outcomes 5,220 597 
The ―deep split‖ in how federal circuit courts dealt with Booker ―pipeline‖ 
cases contributed to the abrupt dislocation in appeals outcomes pre- and post-
Booker.
47
  As Professor Heytens notes, some federal appellate courts imposed 
upon defendants pushing Booker claims on appeal the full burden of 
satisfying the usual requirements for a remand for resentencing.
48
  Other 
federal circuits, by contrast, simply remanded every pre-Booker case in which 
the defendant so requested.
49
  Finally, other circuits carved a middle ground 
by requiring trial judges to publicly disclose whether they would have 
imposed the same sentence had they known the Guidelines were voluntary.
50
  
Remands would arise only in appeals where trial court judges acknowledged 
that they might have (or, in fact, had) imposed a different sentence. 
IV.  INTERPRETATIVE DIFFICULTIES 
Although the results presented above convey some helpful general 
 
45. In this analysis the term ―reversal‖ includes cases that were reversed and vacated as well as 
reversed and remanded. 
46. U.S.S.C. 2006, supra note 19.  Pearson chi-square = 52.80; p < 0.001. 
47. Heytens, supra note 43, at 951–52. 
48. Id. at 951.  See Brief for the United States at 11 & n.3, 12 n.4, Rodriguez v. United States, 
545 U.S. 1127 (2005) (No. 04-1148) (describing decisions from the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh 
Circuits). 
49. Brief for the United States, supra note 48, at 15–16 (describing decisions from the Third, 
Fourth, and Sixth Circuits). 
50. Id. at 13–15 (describing decisions from the Second, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits). 
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information about the federal criminal appellate terrain, they convey quite 
little due to data limitations as well as concerns about selection effects.  As a 
consequence, what we do not know about federal criminal appeals dwarfs 
what we do know. 
A.  Criminal Appeals Data Limitations 
To be sure, the U.S. Sentencing Commission does an admirable job 
gathering and disseminating the leading source of annual federal criminal 
appellate data.  These data support descriptive work assessing criminal 
appeals over time.  Existing data are insufficient, however, to supply the 
necessary context through which the descriptive appellate results can be more 
meaningfully assessed. 
It is, of course, far easier to envision the perfect federal criminal appeals 
data set than it is to actually put it together.  In an ideal world, researchers 
would benefit from a user-friendly data set, organized at the individual 
criminal ―event‖ level, which would include the entire universe of events from 
which the pool of crimes emerges.  Along with the standard and complete set 
of background and control variables, such a data set would track the complete 
disposition of each incident from beginning to end.  This idealized data set 
would permit researchers to observe how the complete universe of criminal 
events winnows over time as it progresses through the criminal justice system, 
with the precious few culminating in an appellate decision. 
Idealized perfection, of course, is neither a useful nor helpful frame of 
reference by which to judge the quality of existing data sets.  The leading data 
set for research on federal criminal appeals, produced by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission, focuses on the final stage of the appellate process—the 
outcomes of those appealed cases.  Obviously, this is an important stage and 
the data permit some analyses of the distribution of criminal appellate 
outcomes.  To better account for one important (potential) influence on 
criminal appeals outcomes, the data need to derive from the universe of 
criminal trials from which the appeals emerged.  Once criminal appeals are 
linked to their trials (by docket number, for example), researchers will be far 
better prepared to assess whether and, if so, to what degree and how the pool 
of criminal appeals systematically differs from the larger pool of criminal 
trials.  Knowing more about the larger pool from which criminal appeals 
emerge—and whether appellate results systematically differ—would provide 
critical context through which to assess the distribution of appellate outcomes. 
Obviously, criminal trial data are subject to similar filtering effects (e.g., 
plea bargaining, prosecutorial discretion, and law enforcement selectivity).  
Although the influences of such filtering on criminal appeals cannot be easily 
dismissed, the practical difficulties associated with gathering data that bear on 
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such filtering are profound.  While similarly difficult and potentially 
expensive, civil trial data, by contrast, are far more readily available.  Indeed, 
an analogous data set already exists in the state civil context.
51
 
B.  Selection Effects 
A seminal work by Professors George Priest and Benjamin Klein
52
 has 
contributed to (indeed, helped frame) the formation of a theory about the 
selection of cases for trial and the rates of success parties enjoy for cases that 
are resolved by a formal trial.  The theory, at its most basic level, includes two 
distinct and severable parts.  First, the sub-pool of cases resolved by formal 
trial systematically differs from the larger universe of legal disputes from 
which they emerge.
53
  The cases that persist to resolution by a trial involve 
―close‖ facts or ―unclear‖ legal rules that are ―difficult‖ to apply.  That is to 
say, the cases that persist to trial for resolution are those for which the 
outcomes are not easily predicted with accuracy.  A second distinct 
component of the Priest–Klein hypothesis flows from the first—that the 
resolution of cases that persist to trial will result in 50% victories for the 
plaintiff and 50% victories for the defendant.
54
 
To note that the Priest–Klein hypotheses stimulated research, especially 
empirical research, is to note only the obvious.  However, results from much 
of the subsequent work testing the ―50%‖ hypothesis are, in the main, 
inconclusive.
55
  Scholars have noted the tremendous variation that 
occasionally appears in plaintiff success rates across districts and case types.
56
 
To the extent that the Priest–Klein 50% hypothesis has not weathered 
subsequent testing well,
57
 few dispute the important contribution from the first 
part of the Priest–Klein hypothesis—in particular, that selection effects 
account for important differences in the sub-pool of cases that persist to a 
resolution by trial (let alone persisting through an appeal) and the larger 
universe of legal disputes from which they derive. 
Priest and Klein formulated their theories within the context of civil 
litigation.  Although the criminal and civil justice systems in the United States 
 
51. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 23, at 127–29. 
52. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
53. Id. at 13–17. 
54. Id. at 17–20. 
55. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework 
with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337, 347 (1990). 
56. Id. at 355–56. 
57. See, e.g., Donald Wittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for 
Trial: A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 315 (1988) 
(discussing sample selectivity bias in the Priest–Klein model); Elder, supra note 2, at 192 
(characterizing the Priest–Klein 50% hypothesis as ―incorrect‖). 
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share many core elements, the two systems fundamentally differ in two 
critical respects.  First, for criminal prosecutions the government must prove 
its case ―beyond a reasonable doubt‖58 and, second, the government is largely 
precluded from appealing acquittals.
59
  For the narrow purpose of this Article, 
the most important aspect is that ―[Priest and Klein‘s] basic insight . . . carries 
over from the civil cases they study to criminal cases.‖60  While the selection 
effects hypothesis straddles civil and criminal cases, differences in the two 
systems implicate selection effects‘ influences.  In particular, as Professor 
Stith noted, structural differences between the civil and criminal justice 
systems, particularly the preclusion of the government from appealing 
criminal acquittals, generate important asymmetries unique to the criminal 
context which, in turn, implicate criminal reversal rates.
61
 
1.  Selection Effects in the Criminal Context 
Throughout the criminal justice process, a number of factors likely act as 
filters that lead to a non-random sample of cases that generate an appellate 
court decision.  Among the factors that are the most difficult to measure are 
the individual acts of discretion exerted by various law enforcement officials 
and prosecutors throughout the four major stages of the criminal case—the 
decision to prosecute, settlement negotiations (plea bargains), the 
determination of guilt, and sentencing.  Indeed, in the criminal justice system, 
many factors and institutions, by constitutional design, influence the stream of 
criminal appeals.  The structural design features that distinguish the civil and 
criminal systems and implicate selection effects include the standard of proof 
required for a conviction and the Double Jeopardy Clause.  The influence of 
various selection effects may distort not only the pool of cases that pursue a 
criminal appeal but also an appeal‘s outcome.  If so, selection effects 
complicate efforts to interpret criminal appellate reversal rates. 
Setting aside law enforcement officials‘ discretion that influences the pool 
of those detained or arrested,
62
 further filtering begins anew when prosecutors 
assess whether to formally seek an indictment and, if so, for what charges.  
Moreover, even in cases where prosecutors successfully secure indictments, 
 
58. The Due Process Clause requires this burden of proof.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
364 (1970). 
59. The Constitution‘s prohibition on double jeopardy mandates this rule.  See U.S. CONST. 
amend. V; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795–97 (1969); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 
100, 126 (1904). 
60. See Elder, supra note 2, at 192. 
61. See Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the 
Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990). 
62. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing 
Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 906–15 (1962) (describing how the exercise of police discretion in 
the arrest function fuels accusations that police ―are harder on‖ black suspects than white suspects).  
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the overwhelming majority of cases are resolved before trial through plea 
bargaining.  Most observers, such as Shavell, argue that such filtering likely 
removes cases where the likelihood of a reversal is comparatively higher.
63
 
Additional filters influence criminal cases that are brought to trial.  To 
secure a criminal conviction, the government must prove its case beyond all 
reasonable doubt.
64
  This threshold is considerably more severe than the  
―preponderance‖ threshold in the civil setting.65  Consequently, by definition 
criminal appeals by defendants who lost at trial involve cases where a trial 
court jury previously concluded that the facts proved the defendant‘s guilt 
beyond all reasonable doubt.  Any cases where the facts are not judged to 
achieve this searching threshold do not even make it into the pool of potential 
criminal appeals. 
Constitutional design and federal statutes designate who can launch an 
appeal in the federal criminal context and, in so doing, further influence the 
stream of criminal appeals.  The Constitution‘s Double Jeopardy Clause has 
been interpreted to largely preclude governmental appeals of not guilty 
verdicts.
66
  What this means in practice is that, while a defendant can appeal a 
conviction, the government cannot appeal an acquittal, despite what 
prosecutors might think about trial court legal or factual errors.  As Professor 
Stith has observed, this pro-defendant procedural ―tilt‖ injects asymmetry into 
the flow of criminal cases that proceed into the pool of potential criminal 
appeals.
67
 
In addition, to the extent that trial judges are mindful of appellate review 
and seek to minimize reversals of their decisions, because criminal trial judges 
can be reversed only for their decisions against the defendant, trial judges 
might be incented to give defendants the benefit of the doubt in their rulings.
68
  
Regardless of trial judges‘ incentives, the filters in place governing the pool of 
criminal appeals inform ex ante expectations about criminal appeals reversal 
rates. 
All of these factors—beginning with discretion exercised by law 
 
63. Shavell, supra note 1, at 414. 
64. It is commonly understood that the Due Process Clause mandates this standard.  In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
65. See Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure’s Magical Number Three: Psychological Bases for 
Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1119 (1987) (noting the ―preponderance‖ rule is 
the ―usual standard in civil litigation‖). 
66. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 126 (1904); Benton v. 
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795–97 (1969). 
67. See Stith, supra note 61, at 19.  Although Professor Stith goes on to consider whether 
selection effects exert a pro-defendant bias in the evolution of legal standards over time, id. at 50, my 
more modest goal is to consider only the distribution of appellate court outcomes. 
68. See R. Erik Lillquist, A Comment on the Admissibility of Forensic Evidence, 33 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2003). 
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enforcement and prosecutors and continuing through the settlement, trial, and 
appellate stages—serve as filters that influence which cases enter the criminal 
justice system, how cases proceed through the system, and what appellate 
outcomes result.  To the extent that such factors exert selection effects, these 
effects influence the distribution of appellate outcomes.  Consequently, a 
textured and nuanced understanding of these admittedly complex selection 
effects is necessary to fully understand the distribution of criminal appellate 
outcomes and what it means.  Although helpful data exist that illustrate the 
distribution of criminal appeals and how the distribution changes over time, 
existing data are insufficient to confidently assess the influences of plausible 
selection effects.  The paucity of data germane to studying selection effects 
limits the analytic weight that data on criminal appellate outcomes can carry. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although pleas for ―more [and better] data‖ are quite common,69 
especially among legal empiricists,
70
 such pleas are especially apt in the 
criminal appeals context.  What remains unknown about federal criminal 
appeals far outweighs what is known.  Moreover, what is known lacks the 
texture and nuance necessary to put results into proper context.  Still, the 
broad contours of existing data on the distribution of federal criminal 
appellate outcomes, while far short of thorough and definitive, provide some 
helpful guidelines and trends.  What these guidelines and trends mean, 
however, and what one can properly infer from them, is far less clear.  
Contributing to the questions‘ complications and illusiveness are severe 
limitations of existing data as well as the influence of selection effects.  Thus, 
while existing data sketch out the general contours of what our federal 
appellate courts are doing in the criminal setting, how to interpret these data 
remains far from clear. 
This lack of clarity flows more from limited data than limited theory.  
Existing data limitations all but preclude assessments of selection effects that 
the structure of the federal criminal justice system almost guarantees exist.  
Throughout the stream of federal criminal cases—from the criminal incident 
itself, to the discretion exercised by law enforcement and prosecutors, and the 
further filtering influences of plea bargaining and the criminal trial—
important factors shape the astonishingly small pool of criminal cases that 
initiate the appellate process.  Because both theory and reality suggest that the 
sub-universe of criminal appeals systematically differs from the universe of 
 
69. See, e.g., Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-
Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 54 (―Like all such studies this 
one has ended with a plea for more study: more data, larger samples, better control groups.‖). 
70. See, e.g., Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 824 
(1999) (noting the need for the greater development of germane data sets for legal scholars). 
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criminal cases from which appeals derive, what to make of the distribution of 
appellate outcomes is not immediately apparent.  To be sure, while more and 
better data may not provide conclusive answers to important questions 
regarding the world of federal criminal appeals, more and better data will 
certainly contribute to and develop our understanding of federal criminal 
appeals. 
 
